



Book Review: The U.S. Financial Crisis: Analysis and
Interpretation: Lessons for China
Cheng Siwei evaluates the effects of China’s countermeasures to the financial crisis and
identifies the excessive growth of ‘fictitious capital’, a concept developed by Karl Marx, as its
root cause. Joel Suss finds that while the author does provide excellent economic policy
advice, he does not spell out policies that may shore up credibility and stop panic from
spreading.
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Find this book
The incredible depth of  the global economic crisis, beginning in the US in
2007-8, is only exceeded in magnitude by its unexpectedness. How could
so many market experts, policymakers, and economists not see it
coming? It is no surprise then that in the wake of  the biggest economic
crisis since the Great Depression many are seeking to draw lessons f or
the f uture.
One such person is Cheng Siwei, Chinese economist and f ormer vice-
chairman of  the standing committee of  China’s National People’s
Congress. Commissioned by China’s leaders to analyse the origins of  the
crisis and the channels through which China’s economy was impacted,
Cheng expanded the report into a book that was also published in
English. His book, The U.S. Financial Crisis: Analysis and Interpretation,
sets out in dry, methodical detail the origins of  the crisis in the US and its impact on the global
economy, and provides general economic lessons f or a Chinese policy-making audience. It has a
government-report f eel throughout, but is interestingly inf used with Chinese Communist Party
rhetoric.
Cheng identif ies the excessive growth of  ‘f ictit ious capital’ – a term originating f rom Karl Marx
and def ined as f inancial products, such as securit ies, that are based on loan capital and the credit system
of  banks – as the underlying, root cause of  the f inancial crisis. This drove the inf lation of  the ‘f ictit ious
economy’ (def ined as the total value of  the stock market, and the balance of  bonds and derivatives)
relative to the ‘real economy’, “enabling its separation f rom the real economy like a horse f ree of  its reins
and eventually becoming a great scourge to the whole of  society.”
Cheng, in lock-step with other analyses of  the f inancial crisis, argues that this was aided and abetted by a
number of  specif ic f actors: unwise US government policy that promoted the US sub-prime mortgage
market, insuf f iciently low interest rates set by the Fed, lax attention and action by ‘captured’ regulators,
rating agencies that colluded with banks to make the complex f inancial instruments appear saf e, and
perverse incentives within the banks the contributed to short- termism and over-speculation.
Financial institutions were loading up on mortgage-based derivatives that depended on US housing prices
continuing to rise. They would of ten, in turn, use these convoluted assets as collateral to leverage
themselves f urther. Then housing prices began to f all, and so with them all the securit ies and derivatives on
the secondary market. Panic set in and the situation progressed f rom “a loan crisis to a crisis of  liquidity
and ult imately to a crisis of  credibility.”
The bubble in the housing market burst in 2007, triggering the crisis, as def aults began to grow f irst in
the sub-prime category and then f or prime borrowers. 2008 saw the Wall Street f inancial crisis, the
government take-over of  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the collapse of  Lehman Bros and bailout of  AIG as
liquidity dried up. In 2009 the f ocus shif ted to sovereign debt as the Dubai credit crisis brought attention to
potentially weak nations. The spotlight immediately narrowed in on Greece when the f inance minister
announced an unexpected doubling of  the budget def icit in November of  that year.
Underlying all these waves is the panic and the loss of  credibility (f irst borrowers, then f inancial institutions
and f inally governments), although Cheng only brief ly acknowledges the behavioural f actors involved and
their importance in reinf orcing the spiralling descent: “It is my view that a credit crisis is essentially a crisis
of  conf idence and credence, and thus the permanent cure f or that is to regain the public’s conf idence and
credence in f inancial institutions and systems as well as their government.” Whilst he does provide excellent
economic policy advice on the whole; such as a central bank that takes into account asset prices and not
only inf lation, the need to protect against excessive debt build up and speculative secondary markets, and
avoidance of  government interf erence in property markets, Cheng does not spell out policies that may
shore up credibility and stop panic f rom spreading and f rom deepening contractions. Similarly, he
acknowledges the problem of  moral-hazard within banks and identif ies short- term payment structures as a
problem but does not provide specif ic policy solutions, some of  which are actively being discussed in
western f inancial centres today.
This book also noticeably lacks insight into the polit ical dimensions of  the crisis. The year 2010 saw not
only the worsening of  the European sovereign debt crisis but also the polit ical ramif ications both within
countries (the street battles and rising violence in Greece, the Indignado movement in Spain, Occupy and
the Tea Party, etc.), and between them, the potential disintegration of  the EU and a budding currency war
being prime examples. By some accounts, the Arab spring was at least partly triggered by global economic
conditions. Cheng Siwei f ocuses solely on the economic implications and draws lessons f or economic
policy, rather than also interpret the polit ical f ailings and consequences.
Readers who are already f amiliar with the crisis and lessons that have (and have yet to be) learnt may want
to skip this book. Beyond a detailed analysis of  the US f inancial crisis, it is interesting only because of  its
China-centric f rame. The reader may appreciate, especially af ter reading the f inal chapter, “Six Balances and
Scientif ic Development”, that much ef f ort has been made to align the text with and appease government
appetite. It provides broad economic policy suggestions without getting specif ic, it appeals to Marxist
theorists with the reliance on the argument that the ‘f ictit ious economy’ grew excessively, and it is devoid of
any discussion of  potential polit ical consequences of  a f inancial crash. For a country such as China –
which many believe to be repressive and illiberal -  this should be a top area of  concern.
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